Published by GeoPoliticsToday on April 28, 2024
By Adam J. Brierley
April 28th, 2024
AUKUS, it may sound like a botched-up Harry Potter incantation, but do not be deceived, AUKUS is real and its geopolitical impacts for the Indo-Pacific are enormous. A strident chord sounds when people speak of AUKUS. At least it should. Unbeknownst to many, skulking through the world’s oceans lurk these blackened and silent beasts of diplomacy, these charred leviathans. Nuclear-powered submarines.
To Australia, China has been an important trade partner since the former colonial days, when the sweet-smelling scent of sandalwood log fires first drifted over the decks of Chinese ships. Following a period of market reforms, the Chinese economy transformed in the 90s, marking the most impressive economic upheaval in human history and as such, Sino-Australian trade became a significant factor in bilateral relations. China gained a taste for the high-end seafood, sandalwood and Shiraz wine which Australians pumped from their shores, whilst Australian coal and ore fueled their industrial expansion. Fast forward to 2020 and the relationship showed the first concrete signs of deterioration, when hawkish Australian politicians passed a law against foreign interference after accusing China of meddling in Australian politics, and placing foreign agents in Australian journalism.
In September 2021 following months of top-secret negotiation, AUKUS emerged from the quiet corridors of Western diplomats as a trans-Pacific defense pact between America, the United Kingdom and Australia. The primary aim of AUKUS; curtailing Chinese intimidation and expansionist policies in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement centered on the use of nuclear-powered submarines as a strategic deterrent to emerging Chinese naval power, including the United States and Britain with their respective ‘Virginia Class’ and ‘Astute Class’ submarines.
Indeed, on the very same day that the pact was formally announced, September 15th 2021, Australia had told Naval Group in France (in which the French government is a major stakeholder) that they were satisfied with the progress of the ‘Shortfin Barracuda’ diesel-electric submarines they had ordered. When the ‘stab in the back’, as one French diplomat put it, of the AUKUS defense pact emerged, President of France, Emmanuel Macron, withdrew French ambassadors from Canberra and Washington in an unprecedented outrage. As a result of the deal the Australians were promised at least eight nuclear-powered attack submarines, of British design and American tech, which would begin to appear after 2040. In the meantime, America offered to rotate up to four of its Virginia-class submarines through HMAS Stirling on Australia’s west coast, beginning in 2027.
In the American epic, ‘Moby Dick’, Melville frequently diverts from the story to delve into the nitty-gritty details to the art of whaling, whale species, and their dissection. In a similar fashion, let’s dissect these marvels of aquatic technology. The Virginia Class subs are fast and stealthy; if need be they could penetrate the South China sea quickly if China were to act in the Malacca Strait or in the South China Sea. Most importantly though, a nuclear-powered sub can cruise for a significantly longer period than their conventional cousins, limited only by their human crew rather than fuel capacity. This means subs can stay hidden and active under water for prolonged and extensive periods time, increasing their potential range and projection of power.
Yet despite the obvious benefits of this shared technology, many Australian politicians remain skeptical. It remains a great commitment on Australia’s part, at a costly $368 billion dollars, and closely ties Australia to America, perhaps to the degree of over-dependence. Furthermore, questions have arisen about whether the US can deliver the Virginia class submarines on time or at all, as the Pentagon has struggled to ramp up production of their Virginia class.
Similarly, across the pond, critics query Britain’s defense capacity, with their reputation for tardiness and underwhelming standards. Furthermore, Australia would be in effect subsidizing the US and UK’s defense industries and procurement networks, without clear benefits to their own. These facts, despite Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albenese’s attempts to sell the pact as a jobs boon, may eventually erode public confidence. Not to mention the shadow of Donald Trump. The prospect of his return, with his growing appetite for ‘America First’ protectionism, could threaten the deal and leave Australia more vulnerable than they started out.
In the Indo-Pacific, the defense pact is just one of many alliances in the east that America has spearheaded. The QUAD (USA, India, Japan and Australia) is another prime example. Contrary to its block-wide NATO approach to control the western flank of the Eurasian continent, in the east America opts for bilateral alliances or a ‘hub-and spoke’ approach, with close allies such as South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Thailand and Australia acting as hubs for troop deployment and a deterrent to Chinese aggressive posturing. Recently, the Biden administration has grown closer to its strongest East Asian ally, Japan, with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio having concluded a meeting with Mr Biden earlier this month. There has been a continuous strengthening of these bilateral relationships under Biden. Following this strengthening, there has been talk of AUKUS acquiring an additional ally in Japan; ‘JAUKUS’ as some have coined it. In a quintessentially American manner, it seems the approach to China’s constant intimidation is more and more deterrence.
AUKUS and the implementation of nuclear-powered leviathans as a cornerstone of Western deterrence to Chinese ambitions in the Indo-Pacific has certainly strengthened the American position in the face of an increasingly better equipped blue-water Chinese navy. The extended range of this technology and the alliance with Australia massively improves American power projection. Will AUKUS expand to Canada and Japan? Is the formation of these strategic alliances deterring or emboldening Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party? These are questions to be considered as we enter an uncertain multipolar world with established geopolitical behemoths such as China.